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Abstract: Based on over 60 interviews and fieldwork in Lofoten, Norway, over a 
five-year period (2008 – 2013), this paper argues that local identity is a ‘missing 
link’ with significant explanatory value when analyzing the contested matter of 
whether to open for oil drilling in this region. Through a Giddensian approach 
to ontological security, we identify a major discrepancy between local and na-
tional discourses on ‘post-petroleum security’ concerns for the Lofoten region 
and its inhabitants – concerns that neither national political debates nor aca-
demic discourse have adequately included. Thus, we highlight time as a variable 
separating local and state-centered perspectives on what sustains (ontological) 
security. We show how an understanding of historically viable communities is 
of core concern for the re-establishment of an identity-based security. Further, 
environmental and societal risks associated with petroleum development influ-
ence the perceived balance between short-term needs for jobs, and long-term 
needs for continued production of local, practice-based knowledge upon which 
a specific coastal identity is built. We also discuss how Lofoten has been put on 
the petroleum map as one of the last petroleum frontiers, and conclude that 
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an analysis including identity as a variable can inform international debates 
concerning the ‘opening’ of the circumpolar Arctic for extractive industries.1
Key words: Arctic, environmental security, ontological security, identity, petro-
leum, Lofoten, Norway
1. Introduction
The saying goes that we, that is, Norwegians, first and foremost ‘do’ oil, that we are 
‘petroleum people’. Not so here! Here, we are fishers, no matter if you have been fish-
ing at sea or not. We all depend on the sea, and have always done so. That’s why we 
can’t just trade fish for oil.2
The above quote is an extract from an interview with a fisherman in 2009 where 
co-author Brigt Dale asked a selection of more than forty locals in Lofoten – a 
region positioned just above the Arctic Circle in Norway – about their concerns and 
wishes concerning petroleum. The stories told during interviews would typically 
begin with respondents making statements in which their position on petroleum 
was explicitly revealed, statements that can roughly be categorized as belonging to 
the archetypical categories of: ‘No way!’ or ‘I really don’t know’ or ‘bring it on!’ This 
was often followed by local respondents arguing for their position with reference 
to their own direct connections to geographical place, to culture and to nature. In 
other words: the importance of Lofoten as a place and cultural frame of reference 
was in this way made explicit. The above extract from an interview in which a sense 
of place is emphasized as a departure point thus exemplifies the complexities in 
Lofoten concerning what it means to be secure and how this is tied to local identity.
Many of the fishers in the region, both young and old, said they would try to 
encourage their children to avoid the fisheries as a source of livelihood. Their inten-
tion was to ensure that possibilities beyond the coastal fishing community they 
lived in were made available to them. The attitude revealed a complex ambivalence 
concerning local identity related to the embeddedness of cultural practices and 
experiences over time. The sense of security connected to the hands-on, culturally 
laden embodied practices of everyday fishing could not hide the fact that life in a 
fishing village in the past was chronically insecure (and to some extent still is today). 
Fishers often died at sea, the fish could fail to appear causing despair and economic 
1. The authors thank those following for reading and commenting on the manuscript: Gaute Wahl, 
Rune Ytreberg, Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv, Laura Junka-Aikio and Kirsti Stuvøy.
2. Interview with fisherman (spring 2009) conducted by Dale.
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ruin for many (a phenomenon called ‘black sea’), and hard physical labor and a 
harsh climate meant exposure to illness and injury. Still, a sense of being secure in a 
familiar environment will in this setting mean that people identify the threats and 
risks associated with the fisheries as a part of the meaningful world in which they 
live. Therefore they accept, and even embrace, the presence of these threats and risks 
without being able to eliminate them. Knowing the world in which one lives is the 
basis for the notion of ontological security, which Anthony Giddens defines as “ …
the confidence most human beings have in the continuity of their self-identity and 
in the constancy of the surrounding social and material environments of action.”3 
We argue that this forms an important part of the basis for local opinion-making 
concerning potential petroleum developments in Lofoten. Interestingly, and as we 
will illustrate through stories from the field, not only opponents but also the advo-
cates of oil and gas developments in Lofoten do not want to ‘trade fish for oil’ – a 
simplified to-the-point slogan often used to describe local sentiments on the matter. 
This tension reflects a process where the considerations, perceptions and expecta-
tions around the choices made today depend on the future – what can or will hap-
pen the day ‘the oil’ comes to an end in Lofoten – and about a possible, viable and 
meaningful future post petroleum.
2. The national ‘front stage’4
The debate concerning whether to open the areas for commercial petroleum devel-
opment (see figure one) has – to the surprise of those not familiar with the last 25 
years of Norwegian petroleum politics – led to a de facto delay of petroleum activities 
in these areas now for 13 years (and counting), calculated from the first postpone-
ment decision by the first Stoltenberg government in 2001. In October 2013, after 
weeks of negotiations, the four victorious political parties after the parliamentary 
election presented a political coalition agreement that secured a change of govern-
ment in Norway, replacing the second Stoltenberg cabinet after eight years in power. 
The two right-wing-conservative parties Fremskrittspartiet (Frp) and Høyre (H) 
formed a new cabinet, supported by two, smaller center parties, Kristelig folkeparti 
(Krf, Christian democrats) and Venstre (V, liberals). During their campaigns, the 
3. Giddens, Anthony, The Consequences of Modernity, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1992, p. 92.
4. ‘Front stage’ here refers to the classical front stage/ back stage debate in sociology, most famously 
described in Erving, Goffman, The presentation of self in everyday life, New York, Anchor, 1959, 
where “front stage” is believed to be the performative stage upon which actors present themselves 
and the imagery they consciously wish to present, as (re)constitutive actions with the intent of 
demarcating identity.
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leadership of both H and Frp had assured their supporters that they would work 
for an opening of the seas outside the regions Lofoten, Vesterålen and Senja (abbr. 
LoVeSe) for petroleum development, while their minor supporting parties both had 
expressed their intention to block such developments. Opponents and proponents 
to petroleum development therefore anticipated the agreement with trepidation, 
locally as well as nationally. The agreement spawned an outcry of disappointment 
and resignation amongst the proponents of petroleum development, as Krf and 
V got their wish; the coalition agreement postponed further investigation aimed 
at opening up for petroleum development in LoVeSe for the whole parliamentary 
period, up until the fall of 2017.
So how can it be that in an oil-rich country like Norway there is such opposition 
and political controversy over the opening up of an ‘untapped’ area for oil and gas 
development that the industry has targeted as the most promising among the eas-
ily accessible areas?5 We claim that there are additional important reasons for the 
delays that are not directly linked to commercial or environmental interests per se. 
We argue that there is a connection between matters of identity and ontological 
security locally and political decision making processes nationally: they constitute 
an important political leeway for the smaller political parties in opposing a large 
majority in parliament for petroleum development, an opposition that to a large 
degree is based on a string of arguments founded on strong local opposition. In 
fact, the previous Minister for petroleum and energy, Ola Borten Moe (who was 
often referenced as ‘Oil-Ola’ due to his eagerness to open new areas), argued in 
2012 that he would have recommended opening LoVeSe, had it not been for the 
strong concerns voiced locally, in particular from the coastal fishers of the LoVeSe 
regions.6 We assert that these local concerns for ontological security are one of many 
causalities influencing national decisions on the matter, but one that has not been 
appropriately focused upon in academic writings until now. Political actors, local 
activists, fishers’ representatives and others have regularly voiced their concerns in 
national media. They have appeared regularly in news reels and in media stories as 
investigative pieces, or – as in the campaign periods prior to the elections in both 
5. Kristoffersen, Berit, “‘Securing’ geography: Framings, logics and strategies in the Norwegian High 
North,” in Richard Powell and Klaus Dodds, eds., Polar Geopolitics? Knowledge, Resources and 
Legal Regimes, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham and Northampton, 2014, pp. 131–148.
6. Ola Borten Moe at the presentation of the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy’s report on con-
sequences for Northern Norway come petroleum development in the LoVeSe waters, Svolvær, 
November 11, 2012. See also news story on the meeting and the various reactions, Budalen Ander 
et al., “Borten Moe vil stenge Lofoten i fire nye år” [Borten Moe will close off Lofoten for another 
four years], NRK, November 23, 2012. Retrieved from: http://www.nrk.no/nordland/vil-stenge-
lofoten-i-fire-nye-ar-1.8407816, accessed May 10, 2014.
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2009, 2011 (local and regional elections) and 2013 – as sites for national politicians’ 
clarification of their position on the issue, preferably pictured with fishing rod in 
hand out on a boat somewhere in the Lofoten waters.
The smaller parties of the new coalition backing the Norwegian Cabinet have 
also claimed, unarguably in line with environmentalists, that LoVeSe is the ultimate 
threshold where petroleum development is concerned, and have therefore made 
concerted efforts to delay the process. This is, not least, based on the argument that 
it is necessary for Norway to cut petroleum production to meet international cli-
mate change obligations. Their efforts also reflect concerns about an oil-dependent 
economy spinning out of control, and about the risk of pollution and oil spills. On 
this basis they argue for sparing the LoVeSe area from commercial drilling, and add 
the potential incentive of including Lofoten on the UNESCO-list as a mixed cultural 
and natural World Heritage site.7 However, we claim, these national processes are 
not their primary argument – but rather the locally based opposition and concerns 
about the effects of petroleum for local communities – what we here discuss as the 
basis for ontological security in Lofoten, after the oil has (potentially) been tapped.
The main political controversy we address here is the tension between opposing 
views from different actors concerning security in and about Lofoten when ‘doing 
oil’. Put simply, state-based approaches towards sustaining security reflect the main-
tenance of ecological and social contracts, where the opening of new areas for petro-
leum development sustains reserves, economic growth and progress, in concert with 
state legislation and management, thus ensuring a predefined notion of development 
within acceptable frames concerning sustainability.8 From a local point of view, how-
ever, the process of the state ‘securing itself ’ might be perceived as a threat to values 
and assets that are important for the assurance and sustainability of local communi-
ties, ontologically as well as physically and economically. In other words, state pro-
tagonists – contrary to their intentions – create insecurity as well as security.9 Being 
secure is not only about controlling and decreasing the consequences of objective 
7. The controversies surrounding the possible application to UNESCO for inclusion of Lofoten into 
the World Heritage list has been almost as controversial locally as has the petroleum issue, and re-
flects a similar sentiment concerning to what extent local actors are enabled to secure themselves, 
their communities and a viable future. There is a growing sentiment In Lofoten that a UNESCO 
status in fact would remove local and regional power to decide matters considered important for 
the development of viable coastal communities.
8. Underthun, Anders and Berit Kristoffersen, “Petroleum-related regional development in Norway: 
The possibilities and paradoxes of internationalization,” in Norsk Geografisk Tidsskrift, 65 (4) 2011, 
p. 189.
9. Stern, Maria, “‘We’ the Subject: The Power and Failure of (In) Security,” in Security Dialogue, 37 
(2) 2006, pp. 187–205.
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threats. It is just as much about feeling secure in a well-known environment; within 
ontological references that contributes to making sense of the world.10
What does this mean for the case at hand; the matter of whether to open up for 
petroleum in the LoVeSe waters? It is obvious that there is a discrepancy between 
the debates as they unfold on the national political ‘front stage’ and in Lofoten. Pow-
erful stakeholders such as the petroleum industry, the environmentalist lobby, the 
labour unions, the Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise (NHO) and, not least, 
the scientific community, all have the know-how and resources needed to make 
their interests and knowledge claims clear and ‘media friendly’. In Lofoten, however, 
petroleum development has triggered debates and reflections concerning who we 
are, what we do, and what we will become, i.e. matters of identity and of securing a 
(viable and desirable) future for individuals and communities that to some extent 
challenge these more state-centred, top-down arguments.11
Before we account for these in more detail, we need to go back to the aforemen-
tioned 13-year ‘delay’ of commercial drilling in LoVeSe. Here we analyse this as a 
series of political trade-offs between political parties when seeking a parliamentary 
basis for cabinets, and between the oil industry and the government. Proponents 
in Lofoten have portrayed these trade-offs as a ‘democratic problem’ and ‘a loss of 
opportunities’ for Northern Norway.12 These trade-offs are the result of the work 
and desire of relatively small political parliamentary parties that have ensured that 
postponement decisions have had to be made.13 There is, however, a curious dis-
crepancy between the number of politicians who want to open LoVeSe and the 
overall tendencies in the population. For example, in the pro-petroleum Labour 
Party, there is a slight majority amongst the party’s voters who favour leaving the 
hydrocarbons in the ground in LoVeSe.14 The apparent ‘democratic problem’ on 
10. Marlow, Jim, “Governmentality, ontological security and ideational stability: preliminary obser-
vations on the manner, ritual and logic of a particular art of government,” in Journal of Political 
Ideologies, 7(2) 2002, pp. 242–259.
11. Dale, Brigt, “Securing a Contingent Future: How Threats, Risks and Identity Matter in the debate 
over Petroleum Development in Lofoten, Norway” PhD thesis at the Department of Sociology, 
Political Science and Community Planning, University of Tromsø, 2011.
12. Ibid.; Jensen, Leif C., and Berit Kristoffersen, “Nord-Norge som ressursprovins: Storpolitikk, risiko 
og virkelighetskamp,” in Svein Jentoft, Kjell A. Røvik and Jens I. Nergård, eds., Hvor går Nord-
Norge? Politiske tidslinjer, Orkana Forlag, Stamsund, 2013, pp. 67–80.
13. Curiously, both political blocks are dependent on these smaller parties for parliamentary backing, 
who then make sure that the issue of petroleum development in the Lofoten areas continues to be 
high on the agenda, no matter from which side of the political aisle the government is formed.
14. Andersson, A. and Høvik T. 2013. “Oljekampen som splitter Norge” [The oil battle that divides 
Norway] Retrieved from: http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/politikk/Oljekampen-som-
splitter-Norge-7299271.html#.U1t588c7z25, accessed May 10, 2014.
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the matter is therefore a complicated issue where not only the power of a parlia-
mentary minority is an issue, but also to what extent the majority represents the 
‘general interest’ on this political issue. This in turn raises the classical question of 
what/who constitutes a ‘community’ – where a variety of imagined communities15 
both supplement and contrast other identities, such as locally or regionally founded 
identities, where the value of ‘the oil’ depends on who profits, at what time, and con-
sequently in which context. The North-Norwegian (regional) identity nordlending, 
and the locally based Lofoting (‘being from Lofoten’), are examples of contrasting 
identities to the nationally constructed ‘Norwegianness’, often evoked when argu-
ing, for instance, for the need for increased petroleum production for the sake of 
maintaining a welfare state ‘for all Norwegians’16 as well as governmental efforts of 
establishing a politics for the ‘High North’.
The political controversy concerning development of the sea areas outside 
LoVeSe has thus reconfigured national power alliances. It has also sparked debates 
on the importance of securing the viability and reproductive capacity of fish stocks, 
as well as the capacity of North-Norwegian communities to still thrive and com-
mercially exploit these and other resources vis-à-vis an introduction of these areas 
into ‘the Norwegian petroleum age’.17 We will later show how this in part can be 
explained, by pointing to the diverging time-scale upon which these two ontolo-
gies, or world views, operate, and go on to argue that the locally based notion of 
ontological security to a larger extent incorporates concern about the possibility 
of viable and meaningful future post petroleum. We therefore turn our attention to 
the discrepancies between the interests of political actors involved in shaping the 
consensus-based Norwegian petroleum politics,18 and the concerns of the major-
ity in this case; concerns that, however, are not reflected in the way the majority of 
voters in Norway use their voting power.
15. Anderson, Benedict, Imagined Communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism, 
Verso publishing, London, 2006 (1983).
16. Statement made by several informants representing national actors (the Norwegian Petroleum 
Association, oil companies, political parties, policymakers and other national petroleum stake-
holders) to Dale in interviews during 2009 and 2010, and Kristoffersen in 2006 and 2011–2012. 
Similar expressions have been made by stakeholders in public debates and to news media during 
the period analyzed here.
17. This sentiment, for example, is shared with readers in a book celebrating 40 years of petroleum 
production in Norway, by former Prime Minister of Norway, Jens Stoltenberg, in Bremer Nebben, 
Kristin “Vi fant, vi fant – Norge feirer 40 år som olje- og gassnasjon”, Font Forlag, 2009.
18. Kristoffersen, Berit, “Spaces of Competitive Power,” MA dissertation, University of Oslo, 2007. See 
chapters 6 and 8.
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2.1 Lofoten and the petroleum fairy-tale
As we started our research on this controversial issue in 2008, we were curious 
about to what extent the petroleum industry’s efforts in cementing the perception 
that ‘What is good for the oil industry, is good for Norway’ was understood and 
accepted as a grand narrative that helped (re)establish Norway’s identity as interwo-
ven with a petroleum-driven economy. Do ‘we’ – that is, Norwegians – understand 
potential oil and gas fields in the North as ‘reserves’ through which we can secure 
our wellbeing in the future? This link has frequently been endorsed by government 
officials, who have has pointed to the importance of oil revenues in establishing one 
of the most comprehensive welfare systems in the world.19 The ‘petroleum fairy-
tale’ metaphor is well-known in domestic political jargon, and points to cultural-
discursive attributes connected to the political economy of oil and gas production 
in Norway, which in turn exposes how choices concerning how to continue or end 
production are inherently value-laden.20 Thus, our reference to local narratives and 
stories as indicative of how one locally acts as a security actor has its parallel at the 
national level, as narratives are created with the intention of constructing a notion 
of interconnectedness between petroleum resources and the ability of the Norwe-
gian government to secure a contingent future for its population. As the Norwegian 
government is aware that oil is running out and seeks a basis for their political stand 
in “intergenerational justice”, Norway directs its oil revenues to a national pension 
fund meant for future generations, while maintaining heavy taxation on the oil 
companies that helps finance generous public services.21 In this way, the Norwegian 
‘fairy-tale’ circulates widely around the world when representatives of the official 
‘Oil Norway’ travel abroad, promoting the Norwegian way around the “oil curse”.22
In an effort to understand how these narratives resonated with the general public, 
we took part in a national survey where we tested the claim of whether opening up 
new areas for oil and gas development in the Northern region of Norway is a “pre-
requisite for the maintenance of the welfare state in the future”.23 The results were 
19. Kristoffersen, Berit and Stephen Young, “Geographies of security and statehood in Norway’s ‘Battle 
of the North,’” in Geoforum, 41 (4) 2010, p.579.
20. Jensen and Kristoffersen 2013, op.cit p. 77.
21. Bridge, Gavin, and Philippe Le Billon, Oil, John Wiley & Sons, 2013, p. 141.
22. Ross, Michael L., The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations, Prince-
ton University Press, 2012, p. 1.
23. The study carried out was on people’s media habits (information sources) and security percep-
tions. It included questions regarding the connection between environmental risks and petroleum 
development, in addition to the main topic of Norwegian military/defense. Marcus Buck at the 
Department of Sociology, Political Science and Social Planning, University of Tromsø led the pro-
ject. Berit Kristoffersen and Brigt Dale contributed to the survey with additional questions related 
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interesting, as a large proportion of the population either fully or partially agreed 
with the statement in 2009 (about 41 percent), whilst the numbers in national stati-
stics for 2012 were up to 49 percent. Just as interesting was the fact that a representa-
tive sample from Lofoten and Vesterålen (two of the three regions abbreviated as 
LoVeSe) showed that attitudes in the region did not differ compared to the national 
average, meaning that the intersection between environmentalism (including cli-
mate change – which we also asked about) and economic growth were not viewed 
differently in the region than elsewhere in the country. However, as studies of Nor-
wegian election surveys make clear: Although a majority of voters favor leaving the 
oil in LoVeSe in the ground for the time being, climate and environmental consid-
erations only influence voting behavior to a small degree.24
Consequently, while the issue does not make people cast their vote for parties 
prone to say no to petroleum in the LoVeSe area, popular disagreement with a 
parliamentary majority out of tune with the majority of the population on this 
matter still, in our view, strengthens the position of these smaller political parties 
when negotiating for political power. Further, we argue, the above issue is blurred 
as the ramifications for welfare, social life, cultural heritage and identity issues are 
obscured by the seemingly straightforward question of choosing traditional eco-
nomic development and growth based on petroleum development, over what is 
often presented as an inevitable process of depopulation, municipal financial decay, 
and lack of alternative livelihoods, as the traditional fisheries provide fewer jobs, 
primarily due to new efficiency measures in the fishing industry.25 On this basis 
we claim that the underlying discrepancy between stakeholders in understanding of 
valuation of petroleum, landscape(s) and alternatives to industrial development is an 
important backdrop for the strong defiance of the idea that the LoVeSe petroleum 
is ‘up for grabs’, if only a certain level of spillover effects could be secured through 
political bargaining. This takes us to the last analysis of the national front stage, 
concerning which role as a ‘reserve’ and as a frontier Lofoten plays in the opening 
up of the Norwegian north.
to environmental issues and petroleum development. The questions were posed to 900 randomly 
selected residents in southern Norway and 500 in the three northernmost counties, and about 50 
of these were in Lofoten and Vesterålen in 2009, and 1000 at the national scale in 2012.
24. Buck, Marcus and Berit Kristoffersen, “Boring etter olje og gass i nord. Lokal strid langs nasjonale 
skillelinjer?,” Ottar, 2 2011, pp. 48–54.
25. Nilsen, Ragnar E., “Kystkrise og nyskaping,” in Svein Jentoft, Kjell A. Røvik and Jens I. Nergård, 
eds., Hvor går Nord-Norge? Tidsbilder fra en landsdel i forandring, Orkana Forlag, Stamsund, 2012 
p. 235.
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2.2 Lofoten and strategic advancement
Reports and mappings by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate have concluded 
that the prospects for oil and gas combined in the LoVeSe area are quite good, and 
the majority of potential oil resources are expected to be in the Lofoten seas.26 
Environmental and fisheries agencies involved in the assessment processes, through 
which this region’s future as a potential petroleum region has been scrutinized, have 
concluded that these areas should not be opened for such activities due to their vul-
nerable eco-system, as this is the main spawning grounds for the northeast Arctic 
cod and other important fish stocks in these waters.27 In the words of two leading 
Norwegian scientists specializing in fish stock viability and the fisheries:
The consequences of underestimating the environmental risk in a uniquely valuable 
and sensitive area such as Lofoten–Vesteralen [the LoVeSe-region] would be much 
more serious than in any other part of the Norwegian marine environment. Faced 
with such uncertainty and dire potential consequences, the precautionary approach 
should come into play and the government should refrain from allowing potentially 
harmful petroleum activity until all problems are resolved.28
26. Indeed, the industry argued in a Konkraft report in 2008 that approximately 3.5 billion barrels 
of oil could be extracted from the LoVeSe shelf, not 2 billion as Statoil previously had suggested, 
or 1.2 billion as predicted by the petroleum Directorate. See Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 
“Petroleum Resources in the Waters off Lofoten, Vesterålen and Senja”, Report, 2010, available 
online: http://www.npd.no/no/Publikasjoner/Rapporter/Petroleumsressursene-i-havomradene-
utenfor-Lofoten-Vesteralen-og-Senja/ Retrieved April 28, 2014.
27. Misund, Arve and Erik Olsen, “Lofoten – Vesterålen: for cod and cod fisheries, but not for oil?” in 
EICES Journal of Marine Sciences, 70 (4), 2013, pp. 722–725.
28. Ibid, p. 725.
SETT INN FIGUR 1 HER
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LoVeSe on the petroleum map. © Norwegian Petroleum Directorate29
The map above is illustrative of the movement of petroleum development on the 
Norwegian shelf northwards, and is in itself an argumentative effort in terms of 
showing how sensitive (and often remote) areas are reachable through the ‘tam-
29 This map can be found at the Petroleum Directorate web-page and the annual report Facts, avail-
able online at http://www.npd.no/no/Publikasjoner/Faktahefter/Fakta-2014/
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ing’ of frontier areas through the utilization of well-known governance technolo-
gies and management tools. In placing these areas on a map of the Norwegian 
petroleum shelf, they are envisioned as having a role in the prolongation of ‘the 
Norwegian petroleum fairy-tale’ through which information about calculation and 
value of natural resources can be disseminated.30 One can argue that this move, 
while acknowledging the vulnerability and uniqueness of the areas in question, has 
the important aim of excluding the possibility of not drilling at all, as it is sought 
ontologically placed within the realm of petro-politics – and not, for instance, envi-
ronmental politics or a more general framework of multiple resource management 
offshore (including fisheries, for instance).
We argue that the movement northwards for the past twenty years can be seen as 
a strategic advancement; a process in which the least controversial areas are opened 
first, followed by a gradual opening up of more (politically) sensitive areas. Political 
compromises are reached by giving the oil and gas industry portions of the areas 
they want, while simultaneously shielding sensitive areas – although not perma-
nently. Importantly, and as expressed by the Minister of Petroleum and Energy 
Odd Roger Enoksen in 2006, “ … before the jewel of Lofoten and Vesterålen comes 
to the table in the other end …” the Barents Sea has to be thoroughly mapped and 
explored.31 Although space limits us from probing deeper into these issues, we find 
it necessary to briefly show how this strategic advancement follows four lines of 
argument. Firstly, as an argument for drilling based on environmental concerns,32 
a new regime called ‘zero emissions’ was established (the area zoned as green). This 
regime was abandoned when new areas in the Barents Sea were opened in 2011 and 
the industry was granted oil and gas exploration areas much closer to shore than 
previously allowed (the areas zoned as yellow), which signaled they were ‘opened 
– but under a specific scheme’. Secondly, a focus on gas rather than oil (concretized 
by the first commercial project north of the Arctic Circle, the Snow White LNG gas 
project) made it much easier to establish and gain acceptance and support for the 
30. Whitehead, Mark, Martin Jones, and Rhys Jones, “Spatializing the ecological leviathan: Territorial 
strategies and the production of regional natures,” Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human Geogra-
phy 88 (1), 2006, pp. 49–65.
31. See Kristoffersen 2014. Op.cit. p. 141. This issue was publically discussed in 2006, when the big 
oil companies criticized the Minister of Petroleum and Energy at the time for ‘demanding’ that 
they take part in exploring the Barents Sea if they expected to participate in later development 
in Lofoten. See also: Ulf Rosenberg 2006, “Gigantene må satse i Nord” [The giants need to make 
an effort in the North], Stavanger Aftenblad April 5, 2006. http://www.aftenbladet.no/nyheter/
okonomi/--Gigantene-ma-satse-i-nord-2117352.html#.U2E9bE2KBaQ, accessed May 10, 2014.
32. See Jensen, Leif C., “Norwegian petroleum extraction in Arctic waters to save the environment: 
introducing ‘discourse co-optation’ as a new analytical term,” Critical Discourse Studies, 9 (1) 2012, 
pp. 29–38.
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first step in the development of the Barents petroleum region in the early 2000s. 
Thirdly, the ripple effects following the Snow White project substantiated promises 
on onshore landing of petroleum and further ripple effects for the next two projects 
Goliat and Skrugard (promises that were later abandoned), and for the potential 
effects petroleum development could possibly have in Lofoten. Fourthly, how devel-
opment of new technology in these projects further north could strengthen argu-
ments that it would be possible to extract hydrocarbons from the sensitive offshore 
areas outside Lofoten within acceptable risk parameters and bring them onshore. 
The opening of new areas in 2013 of the previously disputed area with Russia (the 
green area with a yellow circle on the map) has sparked debate on environmental 
risks, especially relating to an oil spill close to the ice edge. The relevance of this for 
our analysis of the Lofoten case, however, is that just as the Barents Sea has been 
classified according to all the Petroleum Directorate’s variety of colours and zones, 
the southernmost part of the Lofoten waters suddenly reappeared on the petroleum 
map in 2011 (part of area marked in yellow). This area had been closed in 2001 after 
‘media friendly’ civil disobedience actions, organized by the environmental move-
ment before the second exploration drilling was to take place outside Røst in 2001in 
the midst of national elections.33
With this return to the starting point for what we have referred to as the 13-year 
delay of petroleum activities in LoVeSe, we round off our analysis of the national 
front stage. What is of particular essence in this is that in spite of the efforts described 
to naturalise the inclusion of the LoVeSe areas in the future plans for the Norwe-
gian petroleum shelf, the possibility remains that LoVeSe could become the first 
post-petroleum region in Norway, due to a decision not to drill, rather than part 
of the final petroleum frontier – a possibility we ascribe at least in part to the way 
local debate on ontological security, in a future with or without oil, has influenced 
national decision processes.
3. Ontological security in Lofoten
Two extensive studies conducted a decade ago showed that a clear majority in 
Lofoten opposed commercial oil and gas developments.34 The perspectives inform-
33. Ytreberg, Rune, “PR, presse, penger og plagiat,” in Svein Jentoft, Kjell A. Røvik and Jens I. Nergård, 
eds., Hvor går Nord-Norge? Politiske tidslinjer, Orkana Forlag, Stamsund, 2013, pp. 45–66.
34. Brastad, Bjørn, Håkan T. Sandersen, Berit Skorstad and Liv M. Årseth, “Holdninger til olje- og gassut-
vinning utenfor Lofoten, en studie blant befolkningen i Lofoten og Sandnessjøen” [Attitudes towards 
oil and gas extraction outside Lofoten – a study amongst the population of Lofoten and Sandness-
jøen]. NF-rapport 2/04, 2004. Available on: www.nordlandsforskning.no. Four hundred informants 
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ing those results were assessed as a “conditional no” by the group of researchers at 
Nordland Research Institute in a qualitative study, contingent upon consideration 
of whether oil developments would become less risky for the fisheries.35 The focus 
at the time was on “… what level of security and risk (…) is politically acceptable”36. 
One crucial insight that we emphasize in this article – developed after a decade char-
acterized by a prolific production of scientific reports and political debates – is that 
the petroleum question is not only a question about finding a balance that is politi-
cally acceptable locally (or nationally for that matter), neither is it solely about the 
concrete risks, threats and possibilities stemming from petroleum production. The 
debate has also vitalized discussions in Lofoten on identity and the role of ‘the cod’ 
and ‘the oil’ (usually referred to in singular in local debates) for societal develop-
ments, broadly speaking, and on what can, and does, secure Lofoten in the future.37
There is a broad consensus backing the argument that the creation of a sense of 
security in a population is an important task, indeed the very reason d’etre, for state 
politics. Through securing economic development, physical safety, civil and human 
rights and through this a framework for the construction of a sense of togetherness, 
a frame of reference through which the world can be understood – a basis for onto-
logical security.38 A timely question in Lofoten then becomes: What are the securing 
aspects offered through petroleum development in return for the risks involved? And 
importantly, what basis for security locally is not discussed; security that extends 
beyond what ‘the state’ has to offer (or not)?39 Crucially, and as Jim Marlow has 
argued:
in Lofoten were surveyed over the phone in 2003, and more than half of the representative sample 
from Lofoten (56 percent) stated that they did not want petroleum activities; 22 percent were posi-
tive; and about 20 percent felt that petroleum activity could be permitted if ‘certain conditions are 
met’. When asked directly about the possible impacts for the fishing industry, 70 percent believed that 
petroleum activities would have a negative impact, and more than half of the respondents believed 
that oil and gas exploration should not be permitted because of the interests of the fishing industry.
35. Håkan T. Sandersen, Bjørn Brastad and Berit Skorstad, “Den første olje, en intervjuundersøkelse 
i Lofoten om holdninger til oljeutvinning” 2002 [The first oil, an interview based study in Lofoten 
on attitudes towards petroleum extraction]. Available online: www.nordlandsforskning.no
36. Ibid. p. 20.
37. Dale, 2011. op.cit.
38. See for instance Giddens, op.cit.; Hawkins, Robert L. and Katherine Maurer, “‘You fix my commu-
nity, you have fixed my life’: the disruption and rebuilding of ontological security in New Orleans,” 
in Disasters, 35 (1), 2011, pp. 143–159; Steele, Brent J., Ontological security in international rela-
tions: self-identity and the IR state, Routledge, New York, 2008.
39. Hoogensen Gjørv, Gunhild, “Security by any other name: negative security, positive security, and 
a multi-actor security approach,” in Review of international Studies, 38 (4) 2012, pp. 835–859.
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… modern governance provides just one of the elements that contribute towards the 
extent in which, in Giddesian terms, ordinary people in their everyday lives feel on-
tologically secure [ … ] or indeed, existentially anxious, an anxiety [ … ] concerned 
with [ … ] their place in the grand scheme of things.40
This illustrates the point that although state policies might aim at securing the popu-
lation, the same processes sometimes create insecurity as well. Thus, the sense of 
ontological security created by community might be just as important as that which 
is embedded in the practices of the state, and shows that sometimes – as is the case 
of Lofoten and petroleum – national politics aiming at securing the whole (national) 
population can be seen as opposing locally based security.
When identifying locally based identity as an important prerequisite for onto-
logical security,41 we argue that its importance in this matter, at least in part, stems 
from a perceived lack of inclusion of local concerns into the decision making pro-
cess from proponents and opponents to petroleum developments in Lofoten. This 
feeling of subjection and inability to steer important decisions for the future – if it 
is communities, the region or children for that matter – adds to the lack of trust 
in this process. Therefore, we argue, local resentment is based just as much on an 
inability to secure an ontologically coherent future, as it is based on environmental, 
economic, or welfare concerns.
As previously stated, local opposition based on these concerns is a part of the 
basis for the political decision to postpone. Thus, we argue that despite a sense 
of powerlessness in the political center-periphery relationship between Northern 
Norway and the southern ‘core’,42 local identity and security concerns do influence 
national decisions concerning petroleum development in LoVeSe through intricate 
processes. What we find striking, as concluded in the discussion above, is that this is 
the first time local resentment towards petroleum has influenced national political 
decisions in Norway to such an extent. As it stands now, this might be the first area 
in which the necessary priorities for the development of industry and finance in a 
(unavoidable) post-petroleum Norway are tested.
40. Marlow 2002, p. 243.
41. Giddens 1991.
42. Røvik, Kjell A., Jentoft, Svein and Jens I. Nergård, in “Det politiske Nord-Norge” in Svein Jentoft, 
Kjell A. Røvik and Jens I. Nergård, eds., Hvor går Nord-Norge? Politiske tidslinjer, Orkana Forlag, 
Stamsund, 2013, p. 14.
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3.1. Time as a decisive variable
Our article started off with a quote that framed the notion of the two resources – 
petroleum and fish – as being mutually exclusive. Framed like this, they symbolize 
two different ontologies – worldviews, if one will – upon which an ontologically 
secure future can be built. In short, it reflects the idea that there are two opposi-
tional alternative futures that lay ahead; one with petroleum and the other without 
petroleum, but also that there are two different approaches to the long-term post-
petroleum security of the region, one local and one national, that cut across the pro/
con-petroleum divide. The quote that introduced this article thus reveals a position-
ing of ‘resources’ as being vis-à-vis each other, in opposition, where they have com-
peting roles in light of questions concerning economic development. This reflects 
how natural resources depend upon particular narratives, visions and knowledges,43 
and on how societies place value to them in time and space across scales.44 ‘The oil’ 
is a potential calculable reserve, providing the state and the population with future 
wealth as a basis for (ontological) security. Norway’s oil and gas resource base is 
thus important to how future security is constructed and represented in mainstream 
debate. Indeed, whilst these national mainstream perspectives reflect anxieties about 
whether petroleum resources should be left in the ground or extracted now, discus-
sions in Lofoten also reflect considerations concerning when they can or should be 
developed when people seek to secure a viable future –economically, ecologically, 
and physically – and thus ontologically. In the region many argue that we might as 
well wait – we do not know enough, the risk is not worth taking, or we should wait 
and see what we can use the oil for later. As expressed by one of the most important 
local and national figures in fishing politics during the second half of the last century, 
after stating that he was “too old” to really have an opinion on the matter:
… [my] attitude towards ‘the oil’ is that I am not negative to explore for it. However, 
I think it is too early. Let the oil lie where she is. It can benefit future generations.45
Many other informants also revealed this position to us, and argued that for the 
people in Lofoten, there is really no rush. Others of course disagreed, and saw this 
43. Birch, Kean, Levidow, Les and Theo Papaioannou, “Sustainable capital? The neoliberalization of 
nature and knowledge in the European ‘knowledge-based bio-economy’”, in Sustainability, 2(9), 
2010, pp. 2898–2918.
44. Bridge, Gavin, “Material worlds: Natural resources, resource geography and the material econo-
my”. In Geography Compass, 3(3), 2009, pp. 1217–1244.
45. Interview with retired politician and fisherman in Lofoten (Winter 2010), conducted by Kristof-
fersen.
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as a matter of urgency – not because ‘the petroleum age’ could be prolonged, but 
because the region needs the incentives (such as infrastructure, capital, and new 
workplaces/industries) that petroleum is thought able to provide. Even so there 
was concern for the future after petroleum. All pro-petroleum actors the authors 
talked to in Lofoten unanimously argued for petroleum development that in no way 
hampered the future potential for the fisheries. In this, we see a discrepancy in moti-
vation and reason, where the local perspective is geared towards both short-term 
and long-term concern about how to secure a viable future for the region – with or 
without petroleum – while the national debate focuses on the petroleum era (and 
whether or not to include LoVeSe in it).
3.2 Identity-based arguments
In our research then, we see clear connections between the (re)construction of a 
specific identity relating to the aforementioned Lofoting (i.e. ‘being-from-Lofoten’)46 
and what we have defined as ontological security; the sense of a continuous envi-
ronment, natural and social, in which people believe that their self-identity can 
be securely re-established and reproduced.47 The concept is, as has been briefly 
mentioned, clearly connected in modernity to a heightened sense of insecurity, for 
instance due to a lack of trust in experts systems and governmental strategies,48 or 
a lack of a sense of community (or shared ontological world view). This, we argue, 
implies that people make efforts to secure themselves and/or others, and that we 
have to seek a more grounded understanding of the ways in which risks are assessed 
and evaluated by people and communities.49
We therefore emphasize that identity and ontological security are interrelated in 
Lofoten, as premises for mutual development. This symbiotic relationship eventually 
brings us analytically to a central question concerning social life: What rallies people 
together in social groups – be it in close-knit communities, nations or online com-
munities without geographical boundaries, if not a sense of being secure in being 
46. As stated, this article deals primarily with the debate in the Lofoten region, although the political 
issue also spans the regions Vesterålen and Senja. Thus, as far as identity matters are concerned, 
we will limit ourselves to an analysis of the situation in Lofoten.
47. Giddens 1991. Op.cit. p. 92.
48. Beck, Ulrich, Risk society: Towards a new modernity, Sage, London, 1992; Dean, Mitchell, Govern-
mentality. Power and rule in modern society, 2nd ed., Sage Publications, London, 2010; Giddens, 
Anthony, The consequences of modernity, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1990.
49. Stuvøy, Kirsti, “Human security research practices: Conceptualizing Security for Women’s Crisis 
Centres in Russia,” in Security Dialogue, 41, 2010, pp. 279–299; Dale, Brigt, 2011. op.cit, Hoo-
gensen Gjørv, Gunhild H., 2012, op.cit.
104715 GRTID Arctic Review on Law and Politics 1402.indd   217 19.09.14   12:30
berit kristoffersen and brigt dale
218
together with others and in sharing an understanding of the world? When facing 
difficult choices or put under pressure from what is perceived as existential matters, 
people often refer to those identity traits somewhat simplistically characterized as a 
gemeinshaft50 – based on a sense of belonging, togetherness and, as a consequence – 
security, in search of reference points for important decisions concerning the future. 
We further claim that individuals and communities ascribe ontological importance 
to specific actions, symbols and frames of reference, and that the way debates over a 
possible petroleum production in Lofoten waters have stirred discussions and reflec-
tions about who ‘we’ are and who ‘we’ might become, oil or not, has been tainted by 
the specificities of (notions of) a regional, common identity called Lofoting.
In fact, self-ascribed and socially-ascribed locally-based identity still holds great 
merit in Lofoten in a variety of situations, and the identity Lofoting is to no small 
degree based on living close to (and to a certain degree at) sea, where knowledge 
of specific skills enabling the utilization of (and survival next to) the sea is believed 
to be crucial, and where the ability to live off the produce of the sea is an important 
identity marker.51 In the case at hand, our informants in Lofoten used identity-
based arguments when asked to describe their position on the issue of petroleum 
development in the area, as for instance in this extract from an interview with one 
of Dale’s informants – a municipal mayor arguing for investigating the possibility 
of petroleum development in Lofoten:
… I always say that it is the fisheries we live on here, in Lofoten. I have myself con-
tributed as a crewmember, my father-in-law was a coastal fisherman (…) so I’ve had 
it close all along. [But] we have lost 199 fishing boats in my municipality since 1999 
[… and] we cannot support our local communities with these small boats anymore.52
Our understanding of identity in this context is in line with that of Bhikhu Parekh’s 
as that which “… represents the way in which individuals situate and orientate 
themselves in the world”,53 where we focus our attention on the ontological aspects 
of social life; that which makes the world definable and manageable – and thus 
what makes the contingent future ontologically secure. In this, an emphasis on the 
social dimension of identity is necessary that concerned with “membership in a 
particular group or structure of relationship”, as opposed to the personal dimension 
50. Brint, Steven, “Gemeinschaft revisited: A critique and reconstruction of the community concept,” 
in Sociological theory, 19 (1) 2001, pp.1–23.
51. See also Dale, Brigt, 2011, Op.cit. pp. 75–79 and p. 153.
52. Interview conducted by Dale, fall 2009.
53. Parekh, Bhikhu, A New Politics of Identity: Political Principles for an Interdependent World, Palgrave 
Macmillan, New York, 2008, p. 23.
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dealing with individual personal uniqueness, and the human dimension that identi-
fies every human being as “a member of the universal community”.54 Importantly, 
this focus does not exclude an emphasis on both tradition and outside influences 
as important when people construct identity markers that are made relevant in the 
debate over petroleum production in Lofoten and in the ways in which these identi-
ties are ‘filled’ with meaning.
As has been previously argued, “… identity can in this way be understood as both 
ontological practice and symbolic ordering of the world”.55 and a focus in post-mod-
ern (or globalization) theory on the often ‘faceless commitments’ symptomatic of 
the impersonal, modern life56 should not, in our view, make us as social researchers 
underrate the importance of personal relations based on family ties, adherence to a 
common local community or shared historical narratives for regions like Lofoten.
3.3 The symbolic importance of fisheries
As presented, we have found that adherence to a locally based identity influenced 
informants’ positions on the matter of petroleum production in ‘their’ waters, and 
spurred reflections on locally based knowledge and culture and its importance for 
individual and collective construction of identity, be they opinionated opponents 
or proponents to future petroleum development in the region. In Lofoten, lives 
lived close to and at sea has been paramount for the symbolic construction of com-
munity57 and even though few people today are directly involved in commercial 
fishing, the symbolic importance of the fisheries by far outreaches their economic 
importance. This is emphasized in the following statement by a politician (who has 
held positions both nationally and locally), reflecting on how people on the coast 
see themselves as dependent upon nature, and how this dependency is reflected 
through a consideration of time:
Who will harvest from our cropland at sea? Is it those who have traditionally har-
vested? Or is it the oil industry that comes in with a perspective that is twenty to 
thirty years […] In the same field? But worst of all: you may risk that they destroy 
the whole field! This is a great simplification, but that is the symbolic field. Between 
traditional management and the exploitation of resources that is more or less in pact 
with nature, and others who harvest quickly and with great risk before they retreat. 
For 30 years. Suddenly the cash flow dries out. Then [the questions are]; do you [still] 
54. Ibid, p 2.
55. Dale, Brigt, 2011, op.cit. p. 75
56. Giddens, Anthony, 1992, op.cit.
57. Cohen, Anthony, P., The symbolic construction of community, Routhledge, London, 1985.
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have the ones with the coastal culture in their veins? Those who have the knowledge 
of fishing methods and can interpret nature? What have you done to the coastal 
culture in the meantime? (…) This is why many see the oil industry as a real threat 
to a future development of the coastal culture.58
With a focus on a future extending far beyond any potential ‘petroleum age’ in the 
region, we here see that petroleum activities are seen both as a direct risk (through 
blowouts) but moreover as an ‘indirect’ danger to the viability of coastal communi-
ties in the region, post petroleum. It also signals a lack of trust in risk assessments 
presented in the debate taking place on the national front stage, where the risk 
involved to a large extent – at least technically – is described as being minimal. 
What we are then seeing is that values and livelihoods depend upon a concern for 
(and conservation of) nature and the services it provides, and that it is taken care of 
in an intergenerational perspective. As another respondent working in the fisheries 
processing industry expressed, we should not “leave future generations to deal with 
the problems”.59 He related this to non-renewable resources or the tempo in which 
they are tapped, and concluded “…In the end [it is] a question of values”. Sustainable 
management of the fisheries then relies on the continuance of local practices, and 
reflects back on the historical, present and future interdependencies between nature, 
individuals and society. From this perspective then, ‘the petroleum age’ is relatively 
short.60 This brings us to our final analysis, where we use a post-petroleum security 
lens to briefly describe recent historical developments concerning the petroleum 
issue in Lofoten, and to what extent these reflect ideas about future consequences 
and possibilities – both within and beyond the petroleum era we are currently in.
4. Post-petroleum security in the high north
The rhetoric of extracting the oil and gas in LoVeSe in the near future is closely tied 
to the Norwegian governmental efforts of arguing that petroleum activities should 
be a main driver to growth and development in the Norwegian ‘High North’. This 
includes a notion of incentives for development and growth for Northern Norway, 
but unfortunately, ripple effects cannot be guaranteed in advance. Therefore, uncer-
tainty about future benefits for Lofoten has arisen – indeed, there might not be ‘oil 
58. Interview with politician (winter 2010), conducted by Kristoffersen.
59. Interview with fisheries businessman (summer 2012), conducted by Kristoffersen.
60. Stuvøy, Kirsti and Berit Kristoffersen, “‘En feit og fin og norsk en?’ Lofottorsken i internasjonal 
politikk,” in Tidsskriftet Internasjonal Politikk, 71(1) 2013, p. 112.
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for development’ in Lofoten at all.61 Uncertainties are thus reflected in concerns 
over whether Lofoten will be left with a number of risks, and only with minor posi-
tive ripple effects. This has been one of the main reasons why local discussions on 
post-petroleum have cut across the pro/con divide. National actors – mainly the 
environmental movement and small, green-labeled political parties – have promoted 
Lofoten (or rather LoVeSe as a whole) as a ‘petroleum free zone’, but have to a lesser 
degree reflected the concerns of the people on the ground. As we have demonstrated, 
LoVeSe is seen by environmentalists as well as green-labeled political parties as an 
ultimate threshold concerning the protection of nature and the willingness of the 
Norwegian state to take action when it comes to international obligations concern-
ing mitigation efforts; efforts that ultimately require that a substantial amount of 
available hydrocarbon assets are left in the ground. The protection of ecosystems 
has become a key part of these debates, in tune with the accumulating knowledge 
generated as part of the new ecosystem-based principles for the Management Plan 
for the Lofoten-Barents Sea area.62 Within the current resource management regime, 
LoVeSe is considered to be a particularly valuable area with vulnerable ecosys-
tems, and therefore a major ‘battleground’ on the national front stage concerning 
the balance between extraction of natural resources and sustainability concerns.63 
Although the national alliance (between green-labeled political parties and environ-
mental NGOs) has also increasingly integrated their work with the local resistance 
movement, where local and regional fisher’s associations are active participants, we 
still see that a major trend since 2001 has been that national alliances working for – 
and against – opening Lofoten are more concerned with arguing in terms of a ‘battle 
of the North’, in the sense that they argue either in terms of integrated ecosystems 
that extend beyond LoVeSe or having reserves plotted on the oil map, and are less 
concerned with the long-term perspectives of the people of Lofoten.
61. In several interviews conducted by Dale during the spring of 2010, industry actors in Lofoten 
said that whether or not the petroleum fields outside the region were opened would have little 
effect on their market situation as providers of services to the petroleum industry; their capacity 
is limited and growth potential hampered – curiously enough – by a lack of workers, due in part 
to the petroleum industry ‘vacuuming’ the Norwegian labor market, providing salaries and work 
conditions few can compete with onshore.
62. See Dale, Brigt, 2011, op.cit. Chapter 4.4.
63. For the most recent example, see Norway’s updated management plan for the marine environ-
ment in the Lofoten-Barents sea area: Ministry of the Environment, 2011. Stortingsmelding #10, 
2010–2011. Oppdatering av forvaltningsplanen for det marine miljø i Barentshavet og havområdene 
utenfor Lofoten (forvaltningsplan). Available online at: regjeringen.no
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4.1 Preparing for the future
Based on our observations and analysis over a five-year period concerning the stra-
tegic constellations and their changing influence over national politics on the issue, 
we find it pertinent to conclude that a major concern locally, from both adversaries 
and supporters of petroleum development, is how a decision on the matter – be 
it a decision to open for petroleum or not – leaves the region prepared for a post-
petroleum era. The oil and gas resources are discussed at the national scale as either 
being part of the ‘oil in stock’ as national reserves/production securing Norway’s 
future, or not part of ‘the petroleum age’ at all. The time frame for potential har-
vesting of these non-renewable resources is connected to narratives insisting that it 
should happen now, while ‘we’ – the Norwegians – have the know-how and there is 
a market for hydrocarbons as an energy resource – in other words: while we are still 
in the petroleum era. As we have pointed out, the potential value of the petroleum 
possibly available in the Lofoten waters is not understood locally as being limited 
to what Norway as a producing country can make a profit of in a reasonably fore-
seeable future – that is, in the hydrocarbon-driven economy; it is also believed to 
be valuable where it is – and as long as extracting it for energy consumption now 
is perceived as representing a threat to what Lofoten can be post petroleum, local 
skepticism and concerns about how this future is to be secured will remain as a 
friction between local and national interests, be they favorable to petroleum devel-
opment or not.
Time and time again we have received visitors from the south: From politicians, 
environmentalists and oil companies. Those of us who are positive to petroleum 
development have not seen anything concrete come out of all these visits. The last 
time some petro-people came here I told them not to ‘be bothered’ anymore, unless 
they had something specific to come up with. They may just as well stay away – we 
need to focus on other things.64
This statement from 2014 from a business operator in Lofoten is an example of a 
familiar position in Lofoten after many years of waiting and debating petroleum-
related issues – a position that in our view strengthens our argument that post-
petroleum is important for many people and political stakeholders locally, across 
the pro/con petroleum divide. With the latest political developments, which include 
the aforementioned postponement of any new decision on how to proceed until 
after the general elections in 2017, we find the following question pertinent: With 
the petroleum issue again displaced and left unresolved, will local supporters and 
64. Private business operator, personal correspondence with Dale, winter 2014.
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opponents gather forces toward a more general claim for a different approach to 
potential development – one more geared towards securing a post-petroleum future?
The work of the Lofoten Council is especially useful when seeking to understand 
local political shifts relating to how risks are weighed against the potential benefits.65 
When co-author Berit Kristoffersen went through the archives of the meetings of the 
Lofoten Council from the 2000s, she found that a decade ago they mainly centered 
around the fisheries, as was also confirmed in the aforementioned research projects 
from Nordland Research Institute.66 As an example, the working committee of the 
Lofoten Council wrote in a statement in 2002 to the Ministry of Petroleum and 
Energy that they in the preliminary process of mapping the ecological basis in the 
LoVeSe area had to include a broader range of consequences and impacts than what 
was planned for – that they should also include environmental/ecological, economic 
and social considerations.67 Then came a period where the Lofoten Council worked 
more closely with the oil industry, for example on the aforementioned studies in 
2002 and 2004, financed by Statoil and the Norwegian Oil and Gas Association – 
studies where the petroleum actors were quite proactive vis-à-vis the commissioned 
researchers from the Nordland Research Institute, for example, concerning research 
aims and direction.68 Through this and similar processes, then, various representa-
tives for the petroleum industry presented and discussed the potential for petroleum 
development at the Lofoten Council meetings in the following years.69
The regular encounters with the industry did not pass without controversy in 
Lofoten, especially given the growing resistance organization in the region (such 
65. The six municipal mayors that are the voting members of the consensus based Lofoten council. 
Other prominent actors taking part in local debates are fisheries organizations (Norges Fiskarlag 
and Norges Kystfiskarlag) and ad hoc/non-governmental or voluntary organizations formed in the 
wake of this debate; Lo-Ve Petro and the People’s Action for a petroleum-free Lofoten, Vesterålen and 
Senja. Lo-Ve Petro works towards and promotes opportunities that could be brought to the region, 
where its foremost objective is “as soon as possible to open Lofoten and Vesterålen for a petroleum 
industry based on stringent safety and environmental standards”, according to its articles of associa-
tion.
66. Kristoffersen read all official meeting records and reports back to 2001 that dealt with petroleum 
development in the summer of 2010, at the Lofoten Council’s offices in Vestvågøy, Lofoten.
67. The report of the meetings is not available online, but this second meeting took place in February 
2002.
68. Brastad et al., 2004 op.cit; Sandersen et al., 2002. Personal communication with two researchers in 
these research projects in 2011 and 2014 (Kristoffersen), who as an example expressed that it was 
the oil industry who wanted to include Helgeland in the quantitative study, which the researchers 
themselves did not feel was necessary.
69. The most active stakeholders from the petroleum industry were the oil companies Shell, Statoil, 
and the Norwegian Oil and Gas Association.
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as through the People’s Action for a petroleum-free Lofoten, Vesterålen and Senja). 
In 2010, the debate escalated as the Council made it clear that they would support 
political efforts to proceed with an opening process through an impact assessment. 
With the conflict at its height locally, many politicians responded to accusation of 
being co-opted by the petroleum lobby by turning the focus towards the close ties 
between the local resistance movement and environmental NGO’s, in an effort to 
de-legitimize the campaign through arguing that Lofoten would become a ‘victim’ 
of state policy, or “a climate hostage” as one mayor put it during an interview (if 
oil drilling was not allowed in Lofoten due to climate change concerns).70 Strate-
gies of de-legitimizing opponents and advocates towards drilling in Lofoten were 
employed on the grounds that neither the oil companies nor the bigger environ-
mental NGOs were legitimate actors that could secure Lofoten, ontologically speak-
ing. Today however, focus is once again back on what possibilities a future without 
(or after) petroleum might bring. In all fairness it has to be mentioned that national 
politicians have advocated this focus as well, to the extent that a process was initi-
ated in 2012 with the intent of producing an assessment of the other industries (that 
is, all but petroleum) and their future potential in and for Northern Norway.71 We 
will here, however, let two reports produced for the Lofoten Council, four years 
apart, illustrate the observable changes in focus we have identified; from a strong 
emphasis on petroleum to an inclusion of other alternatives which also includes a 
post-petroleum era – whether that occurs soon (meaning that petroleum develop-
ment will be dropped altogether) or at a much later stage (after a petroleum era in 
the region). Firstly, the joint report by the Lofoten and the Vesterålen Councils in 
2010 called LoVe 2025 – perspectives for Lofoten and Vesterålen towards 2025, with 
and without petroleum, stated that:
It is an essential requirement that oil or gas from any discoveries is brought to shore 
for processing. This is the only measure that ensures regional ripple effects. It may 
have a slightly higher cost than an offshore solution, but these must be weighed against 
70. Interview with a mayor in Lofoten, (winter 2010), conducted by Kristoffersen.
71. This ‘knowledge-gathering’ process is in itself an interesting case for further discussion and devel-
opment of a post-petroleum focus. It brings attention to how the governmental intent to meet their 
obligations as a security actor, broadly speaking, is in flux; from a primary focus on industrialization 
processes, where the petroleum possibilities were seen as the ‘locomotive’ for change in the north, to 
an understanding of the need for a broader process in which other considerations have to be taken 
into account. The final report from this process will be released in April 2014, and its sub-reports can 
be found at this web site: http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/nfd/tema/reiselivsnaring/prosjekt-for-
kunnskapsinnhenting-om-verd.html?id=676814, accessed March 12, 2014.
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the societal effects that developments provide. The industry has understood that land-
ing [onshore] concepts are the only possibility in order to open vulnerable areas.72
A more recent scenario assessment (in progress) is made in collaboration with 
the design company Snøhetta73 and represents a refocusing on how to create growth 
based on the capacities, advantages and values unique to Lofoten. In its introduction 
it states “[t]he best way to predict your future is to create it”74 and focuses on sce-
narios which do not concretely include a petroleum era; a focus which can be either 
seen as an argument against petroleum or as an effort to see beyond the petroleum 
age, whether or not it will manifest in this region. The idea of a region where absence 
of petroleum development is seen as an asset, and not something to be compensated 
for, is typically what we would argue is part of an ontology – a world view – in which 
post-petroleum concerns inform and influence perceptions and attitudes towards 
petroleum development itself, and further, that this world view to a much greater 
extent shines through in local debates and initiatives concerning how to secure a 
viable future in Lofoten, moreso now than in 2010. At that time, the effects thought 
to emanate from petroleum production were argued for in terms of workplaces and 
economic ripple effects, and the arguments pitted towards the adversaries to petro-
leum based on their apparent lack of alternatives to the incentives oil could provide. 
Locally though, as we have shown through examples from fieldwork, the concerns 
were already then geared towards what to do, what would happen post petroleum – 
and that valuation of a petroleum-free region was called for. Today then, when the 
Lofoten Council again asks for reports on what alternatives there are for the future, 
petroleum or not, post-petroleum concerns are more explicit and given a higher 
potential value. In short, this trend illustrates that concerns about petroleum and 
its effects are reconfigured into multiple debates, reflections and reorientations in 
which concerns about who ‘we’ are, what ‘we’ are, and what ‘we’ become are central; 
concerns which reflect back to what is important for the maintenance of identity, 
and thus ontological security – post petroleum.
72. Nordland fylkeskommune, Vesterålen regionråd & Lofotrådet (2010) LoVe 2025 – Perspektiver 
for Lofoten og Vesterålen mot 2025, med og uten petroleumsvirksomhet. Available at: www.lofot-
radet.no
73. Snøhetta is an internationally renown architectural and brand design company specializing among 
other things in place attractiveness, a competence the Lofoten Council wanted to tap into when 
deciding to ‘restart’ a process aiming at envisioning future possibilities for the region. See web 
sites www.snohetta.com and http://www.lofotradet.no for more information about the project. A 
short film made about the process can be found here: http://www.lofotposten.no/Video_import/
article7123401.ece, accessed May 2, 2014.
74. Snøhetta 2014: “Lofoten 2030: Mulighetsstudie på oppdrag for Lofotrådet”, p. 2.
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5. Concluding remarks
We have argued that there has been a lacuna in analysis and descriptions on the dis-
crepancies between security issues – broadly speaking – dealt with on the national 
political stage, and concerns and issues discussed by our informants in Lofoten. 
These discrepancies are tied to different foci concerning the need for ontological 
security of the population in Lofoten post petroleum – in fact, we claim that the issue 
almost exclusively has been grappled with locally. These sentiments, we claim, have 
constituted an important basis for the political decision to postpone petroleum 
development in these areas until at least after the next general election in 2017 (or 
rather, to postpone making decisions that would take the process towards an open-
ing of the areas for petroleum development further) – a direct connection between 
local concerns and national politics we have found to have been insufficiently 
explored in academic literature thus far. When filling this research gap – through 
which we have also identified local identity as important for how ontological secu-
rity is understood and negotiated by stakeholders and communities in Lofoten – we 
have emphasized that time is an important variable in the way risks and possibilities 
with regard to petroleum development are approached. One reason for this is that 
national supporters downplay the relevance of this long-term perspective when 
discussing matters of importance for petroleum policy, be they adversaries to petro-
leum development or supporters of policies that extend it.
Oil company logics and strategies are meant to secure reserves in the short and 
medium run, and the adversaries focus on risks, speaking within the same time 
frame when arguing against it and only to a lesser degree on future, post petroleum 
possibilities regionally. And although the claim to ‘future welfare’ that we discussed 
as part of the national narrative of the ‘petroleum age’ lies ahead in time, the rhetoric 
is that it depends on an understanding of a need for Lofoten’s petroleum resources 
to be extracted now, to be placed in the national pension fund that is invested glob-
ally, in order to aid in securing the future of the petroleum-financed welfare state. 
In this sense, the ‘oil in stock’ is both future pensions and national reserves. Accord-
ingly, Lofoten’s oil and gas resources can ensure both the oil companies and the 
Norwegian population in the future, if the government ensures access today. And 
as tensions mount across the Arctic concerning the utilization of natural resources 
and its implications for nature, culture and future, the analysis here presented may 
very well be relevant for individual cases and broader analysis of, say, regional or 
national strategies, in which both national demand for resources and local concerns 
about a future beyond a (potential) excavation period are considered.
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